The potential for signi…cant and ever-increasing productivity gains due to the o¤shoring of production tasks has recently been noted in the theoretical trade literature. This suggests that empirical speci…cations designed to test the impact of o¤shoring on employment should be theoretically motivated in order to incorporate competing channels of in ‡uence. To this end, the model of tasks o¤shoring introduced in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) is …rst extended to a continuum of sectors with sector-level heterogeneity in the intensity of use of o¤shorable tasks. It is shown that the e¤ect of o¤shoring depends on the intensity of use of these tasks and, ultimately, impacts domestic employment through three channels: a direct employment e¤ect, which negatively impacts employment; an output e¤ect, which reorganizes and increases aggregate production in the economy and impacts domestic employment positively; and a substitution e¤ect among factors and tasks, which has an ambiguous e¤ect. In addition, the model predicts that the output e¤ect may be increasing in the extent of previous o¤shoring under given conditions suggesting that, if these conditions hold, o¤shoring may be employment-enhancing in the long run.
Introduction
Recent empirical work suggests that although existing job losses due to o¤shoring are small relative to the size of the U.S. economy, the number of potentially o¤shorable jobs is large, perhaps upwards of 20 million 1 . Furthermore, recent theory suggests that the impact of o¤shoring on labor markets involves both gains and losses and, moreover, that the gains may be increasing in the extent of o¤shoring.
Thus, empirics and theory both suggest that the e¤ects of o¤shoring, whether good or bad for U.S.
workers, have only just begun to be felt. As a result, careful attention should be paid to the competing channels through which o¤shoring a¤ects workers as highlighted by recent theory, and empirical work should take these into account. This paper develops a theoretical structure for this purpose and then applies it in order to generate new estimates of the impact of o¤shoring on U.S. employment while also exploring the size and pattern of the associated productivity gains.
The theory presented here is based on a recent model by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008, GRH henceforth) and assumes an ordering of workplace tasks according to their relative o¤shorability such that improvements in the technology for o¤shoring lead …rms to progressively send more di¢ cultto-o¤shore tasks overseas. A …rst important result is that the cost savings associated with moving tasks overseas leads to increased productivity, output, and labor demand on the part of …rms. It is shown that in the case in which the o¤shoring country is small in world markets this occurs via a Rybczynski e¤ect, and when the country is large the Rybczynski e¤ect is mitigated and the gains redistributed such that all industries expand. When combined with the direct negative employment impact that arises due to the reduced range of tasks performed domestically, the aggregate impact on employment may be positive or negative. The theory also highlights the role of industry heterogeneity in the use of o¤shorable labor, as …rms that use o¤shorable labor relatively intensively should disproportionately shed more workers as the result of a marginal increase in the extent of o¤shoring. Similarly, it is shown that the productivity gains that o¤shoring imparts should be larger for …rms that use o¤shorable labor more intensively. The empirical results provide evidence for both these e¤ects.
The model also predicts that within industries the productivity gains will be increasing in the extent of o¤shoring, and thus so will output and the demand for labor, a result thus far unexplored in the empirical literature. The model suggests that this e¤ect is the result of cost savings that …rms acquire from tasks that they had previously o¤shored. The theoretical possibility of cost savings from 1 See, for example, Blinder (2007) . these "infra-marginal" tasks is emphasized in GRH (2008) , and the empirical section provides evidence in favor of this e¤ect. Finally, the model suggests that factor prices will vary in response to o¤shoring, as will the price of domestically performed tasks relative to those performed abroad. The former will be explicitly controlled for in the regressions while the latter, it will be shown, will contribute to the magnitude of the measured direct employment loss due to o¤shoring.
This paper sits within a recent literature that approaches the question of trade in intermediates from the standpoint of production tasks. The theoretical literature on trade in tasks, which owes much to previous work on trade in intermediates 2 , has recently been energized by GRH (2008) , and has spawned several general equilibrium model extensions. Empirical tests which focus on production tasks in the context of o¤shoring include Hummels, Jorgensen, Munch, and Xiang (2010) , Ottaviano, Peri and Wright (2010) , Becker, Ekholm, and Muendler (2007) , Blinder (2007) , Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips (2009), and Kletzer and Jensen (2007) . Ebenstein, et al. (2009) is the closest related to this paper as the authors regress a measure of U.S. employment on measures of employment within multinational a¢ liates (their de…nition of o¤shoring), along with several controls. The authors …nd a negative impact on U.S. employment due to o¤shoring to low-income countries and a small, positive impact due to o¤shoring to high-income countries. However, the regression speci…cation they adopt e¤ectively shuts down the output e¤ect channel, thus only capturing the direct employment losses due to o¤shoring. Here I speci…cally estimate the impact of the output e¤ect. Furthermore, I construct a plausibly exogenous measure of o¤shoring that is more broad than Ebenstein, et al., potentially capturing o¤shoring that occurs at "arm's length", rather than just intra…rm o¤shoring. Hummels, et al. (2010) is also similar as it approaches the e¤ect of o¤shoring on wages and employment at the level of the …rm and individual workers via a Danish matched …rm-worker dataset.
That paper is also careful to account for the output e¤ect arising from productivity gains due to o¤shoring and, ultimately, estimates an impact on low-skill employment that is similar in magnitude to what will be shown in the present paper for U.S. workers. Ottaviano, Peri and Wright (2010) also motivates an empirical test using the tasks model and …nds no net employment loss due to o¤shoring (nor immigration) and in fact …nds small, positive e¤ects for low-skill workers.
Finally, in the empirical work it will be necessary to de…ne U.S. workers (or, more speci…cally, their occupations) as being more or less o¤shorable. To do this I draw from a recent literature that suggests that workers who perform "routine" or "non-interactive" tasks are more vulnerable to o¤shoring. Other empirical work which utilizes production tasks in alternative (non-trade) frameworks include Peri and Sparber (2008) , who draw conclusions regarding the impact of immigrants on native workers using the same O*NET dataset used here; Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) who use a precursor to the O*NET in order to characterize the e¤ects of computer adoption on wages; Autor and Dorn (2007) who tie the task-content of di¤erent labor markets to subsequent patterns of wage and employment polarization;
and Spitz-Oener (2006) who uses …rm-level data from Germany and …nds that production tasks are becoming more complex over time, particularly in industries which rapidly adopted computers. The wide range of studies exploring the determinants of changes in the nature of work in industrialized countries illustrates that there are a variety of forces at play in the economy which alter the distribution of workplace tasks. This suggests that a clear and testable theoretical roadmap is needed and for this reason the next section derives a structural speci…cation to then bring to the data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 extends the GRH (2008) model to a continuum of industries and derives structural predictions. Section 3 describes the data and variables to be used.
Section 4 implements an empirical approach in order to explore the impact of o¤shoring on task use and employment. Section 5 concludes.
A Model of Labor Demand under O¤shoring
This section extends the GRH (2008) model of o¤shoring to a continuum of perfectly competitive industries. In order to produce output, production (e.g., assembly-line) and non-production (e.g., backo¢ ce or managerial) workers perform a range of tasks and it is initially assumed that the tasks performed by production workers can be moved o¤shore, but not those performed by non-production workers. However, it is often noted that both low-and high-skill tasks (comparable to the production and non-production formulation used here) may be vulnerable to o¤shoring (see Blinder, 2007 Blinder, , 2009 ), and the model that follows can be easily extended to allow for o¤shoring of non-production tasks.
The model is de…ned by the following assumptions. First, production workers perform tasks that are then combined to produce an intermediate composite good l, while non-production worker tasks are combined to produce the intermediate composite h. These composite goods are then assembled to produce …nal output. Further, industries di¤er in their production technologies-some industries are relatively more intensive in the use of production work and less intensive in non-production work.
Formally, there is a Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson (1980) continuum of industries denoted by z 2 [0; 1] and ordered by their factor intensity, l(z)=h(z), such that industries with lower z are less intensive in the production composite. 3 Speci…cally, l(z) and h(z) are combined in the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
where A(z) is a technological parameter and the cost-share of the production factor is given by l (z), where 0 l (z) > 0 due to the assumed ordering of industries. Demand for output is also assumed to be Cobb-Douglas and is de…ned further below.
Workers face a perfectly competitive labor market and are endowed with one unit of labor that is expended performing a range of workplace tasks that are combined to produce the production and non-production composites. Again, for now the non-production tasks can never be moved o¤shore (it is simply too costly to do so) and so the focus is on the production tasks. The range of tasks performed is normalized to a 0 to 1 continuum, i 2 [0; 1], and both intermediate composites combine tasks through a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology, which for the production composite is given by:
where l (i; z) is the input of task i in industry z and > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between tasks. Furthermore, production tasks are de…ned so that when a task is performed at home for …nal industry z, a unit of task output is produced using a l (z; ) units of production labor. The dependence of the unit labor requirement on the relative price of production and non-production labor, noted by the "dot", will be set aside in the notation. Note that more production labor-intensive industries will require more production labor to produce a unit of output, i.e., a 0 l (z) > 0.
O¤shoring takes the form of performing production tasks abroad, however the …rm incurs additional costs to do so. Speci…cally, these costs can be separated into a component that is common to all tasks in all industries, , and an additional component that is speci…c to the task being o¤shored, given by t(i), but which also is common across industries. The task continuum is ordered by decreasing vulnerability to (or increasing cost of) o¤shoring, such that t 0 (i) > 0. Combining this with the unit labor requirement for task production, the unit cost of performing a task abroad is t(i)a l (z) so that 3 See Romalis (2004) for a similar setup integrated within a monopolistic competition framework.
1= t(i)a l (z) is the marginal productivity of o¤shore workers. Again, note that this varies across tasks and industries. In order for o¤shoring to be costly it is assumed that t(i) 1.
For any particular task, home and foreign labor are assumed to be perfect substitutes such that each task will be performed by the lowest cost worker. This implies the existence of a single marginal task, I, between the home and foreign production locations in industry z. Noting that the unit price of any production task, denoted p l (i; z), is assumed to be equal to its unit cost, we can write:
where will denote the foreign country throughout. 4 The marginal o¤shored task is therefore de…ned by the following equilibrium condition:
which simply states that the cost of performing the marginal task at home must equal the cost of performing the task abroad. Figure 1 depicts this equilibrium: as falls the marginal task shifts rightward, increasing the range of tasks performed o¤shore. The empirical sections will focus on reductions in as the driving force behind increases in the extent of o¤shoring across industries.
The Demand for Production Tasks
Combining (1) with (2) we can now solve for the demand for production task i in an industry z, which is given by:
where P h (z) = qa h (z) is the exact price index for the non-production composite and P l (z) is the production counterpart, equal to:
4 Note that it has been assumed that the home …rm can bring its production technology with it to the foreign country, so that a l (z) = a l (z).
Using (3) we can rewrite this price index as:
where
re ‡ects the distribution of production tasks across the domestic and foreign locations. This is the source of the "productivity e¤ect" in GRH (2008): as falls and the set of tasks being performed abroad grows the …rm saves on the marginal tasks but, in addition, saves on the infra-marginal tasks o¤shored previously, a source of cost-savings that could potentially lead to a signi…cant decline in the price of the production composite. 5
Finally, the total labor needed to perform production task i is given by D l (i; z) = a l (z)l(i; z), so that for a given industry z total domestic demand for production labor is:
Comparative Statics
Equation (6) will be the starting point for the empirics. But …rst, the impact of falling o¤shoring costs (declines in ) on each of the terms in (6) will be discussed.
Direct Employment E¤ect
First, note that from (3) and the fact that t 0 (I) > 0 that
5 From (5), one can show that < 0 (discussed further in section 2.2), we have that
> 0 so that falls as o¤shoring costs decline. This is the productivity e¤ect of o¤shoring. so that falling o¤shoring costs lead …rms to move tasks overseas. From this it follows that the …rst term in (6), a l (z)(1 I), represents a direct loss of employment at home-i.e., it takes less domestic labor to produce a unit of output as the result of o¤shoring-an e¤ect that is increasing in the use of o¤shorable labor, z, due to the fact that a 0 l (z) > 0. This will be referred to as the "direct employment e¤ect" of o¤shoring.
Output E¤ect
O¤shoring will also a¤ect the distribution of production across industries within a country via an "output e¤ect". When the country is small in world markets this is simply due to a Rybczynski e¤ect, whereas in the large country case the e¤ect is entirely di¤erent, with the decline in the output price resulting is an expansion in output in all industries. However, both of these mechanisms serve to shift labor and production toward industries that are relatively intensive in the use of production labor.
To see this, I …rst assume that the Home country trades …nal output with a Foreign country, that the Home country is large, and that together they constitute the world economy. Full employment and immobility of factors across countries are assumed throughout. Home and Foreign preferences for industry output are given by the following Cobb-Douglas utility function:
so that the share of income in either country spent on the output of any industry z is a constant, (z). On the production side, each of the industries is taken to be uniformly less productive in Foreign relative to Home, so that there is a Hicks-neutral productivity disadvantage A > 1 abroad. In an integrated world economy this leads to "adjusted factor price equalization" such that:
It follows that the ratio of e¤ective factor prices w (I)=q and w =q are equal across countries and therefore so are the unit labor requirements, a l (z) = a l (z) and a h (z) = a h (z).
Making world expenditure on all goods the numeraire, and setting total (global) sales of z equal to aggregate expenditure on z we have that
As we will see, the e¤ect of o¤shoring will be to cause a decline in the output price in an industry z by reducing its marginal costs. Then, since world expenditure on z is …xed, this will generate an increase in output in z. However, from (9) it is unclear how this output will be distributed across the two countries, a well-known consequence of the case considered here in which there are more industries than factors. 6
In order to escape this indeterminacy, note that if we allow e¤ective factor prices in the two countries to di¤er then goods will be produced in the lowest cost destination. One way to see this is to note that equilibrium output prices must satisfy P Y (z) = minfc(w; q; z); c (w ; q ; z)g, where c(w; q; z) and c (w ; q ; z) represent Home and Foreign marginal costs. From this it is clear that when c(w; q; z) 6 = c (w ; q ; z) the location of production is determinate. Since this will be the case for even a small deviation from adjusted factor price equalization, here I follow Xu (1993) and others in assuming that there is such a deviation in the form of vanishingly small trade costs for …nal goods. 7 These trade costs will be thought of as being positive, but extremely small, so that the prices of factors and output are arbitrarily close to the integrated equilibrium values-i.e., adjusted factor price equalization is maintained. 8 If we further assume that the Home country is relatively abundant in non-production labor then the production pattern becomes determinate with Home specializing in, and exporting, non-production labor-intensive goods and Foreign specializing in, and exporting, goods intensive in production labor.
Now the marginal industry can be denoted by z y such that c(w; q; z y ) = c (w ; q ; z y ), so that …rms are indi¤erent between producing the marginal good at Home or in Foreign. As a result, the set of industries producing …nal output in Home is [0; z y ) and in Foreign is (z y ; 1]. 9 Figure 2 illustrates this world equilibrium. It is important to note that the presence of o¤shoring means that the Foreign economy will still be active in industries [0; z y ), producing the tasks over the range i 2 [0; I), but here it is as if all "assembly" activities-the taking of task outputs and assembling them into the composite good l(z) to be used in producing …nal output-take place costlessly at Home, so that …nal output originates there.
With specialization in production across countries, we can now write (9) as:
so that the location of production in any industry z is now fully determined.
Focusing on Home country production, log di¤erentiation of (10) yields the following relationship:
Note …rst that if the Home economy takes output prices and the Foreign wage as …xed (i.e., if the Home economy is small in world markets), then from (8) it follows that as o¤shoring costs decline then b w = [ (I) and b q = 0, so that in general equilibrium there is an increase in the Home production wage which completely o¤sets the productivity gain ( [ (I)), while there is no change in the non-production wage. This is the productivity e¤ect noted above and which is the focus of GRH (2008) . The e¤ect on output in this small-country case is simply a Rybczynski e¤ect such that production is reorganized toward production-labor intensive industries at the expense of industries that are relatively intensive in non-production labor. In equilibrium, this process leaves marginal costs, and therefore output, unchanged in all industries.
While this case is unsuitable as a description of the empirical exercise based on U.S. (large-country) data to come 10 , it demonstrates that when output prices are …xed the productivity gain from o¤shoring manifests entirely via an increase in the Home production wage, with no concurrent employment gain (since from (6) employment and output are colinear). The large-country case, however, is a more realistic framework, and in this scenario o¤shoring will generate a net increase in output, and therefore employment, in every industry. This occurs because the output growth that follows the decline in o¤shoring costs also puts downward pressure on output prices, and more so in production-labor intensive industries. As a result, the Rybczynski e¤ect is mitigated by the falling output price (since …rms facing lower prices will supply less). Now the equilibrium is pinned down by the demand side-which can be seen in equation (10)-and, in the end, output will both reorganize toward industries that use o¤shorable labor relatively intensively while also increasing in every industry. More formally, the following proposition serves as the …rst testable result:
Proposition 1 If a country is large in world markets, and under the assumption that both preferences and …rms'technologies are Cobb-Douglas, there will be an increase in output in all industries, and the magnitude of this increase is rising in the relative production-labor intensity.
Speci…cally, the decline in marginal costs is due to an unchanging non-production wage (b q = 0)
combined with a decline in the e¤ective production wage ( b w + [ (I) < 0). To prove this, …rst note that the e¤ective factor endowments in Home are given by A . With adjusted factor price equalization total factor payments can therefore be written as:
where ! = w (I) and E is total world expenditure, which has been normalized to 1. Taking natural logs and di¤erentiating (12) and (13), we have:
However, the Cobb-Douglas production technology implies that the cost shares are constant, therefore both d l (z) = 0 and d h (z) = 0. So, in the large country case the cost of non-production workers remains unchanged, just as in the small country case, while the change in the Home component of the production wage is equal to:
De…ning the term in brackets as T , it is easily shown that 1 T 0, and since o¤shoring leads to a fall in [ (I) the Home production wage is non-decreasing in o¤shoring costs. However, whereas in the small country case the rise in the Home production wage perfectly o¤set the decline in (I), now the rise in the wage is equal to a fraction T of the decline in (I).
Returning to (11) and using the fact that b q = 0 and b
there is an output e¤ect in all industries, the magnitude of which is increasing in z due to the fact
The Role of Inframarginal Tasks
The second testable result is obtained by substituting (14) into (11), which results in the following relationship between output growth and percentage changes in o¤shoring costs:
Since the terms in brackets are always positive, falling o¤shoring costs ( b < 0) clearly generate an output e¤ect for all I > 0, a result already proved above. Further, we are interested in whether a given decline in o¤shoring costs will generate an increasing output e¤ect, [ Y (z), as I increases. Since
[ (I) < 0, the second bracketed term in (15) contributes to an increasing output e¤ect. Provided that the …rst term is also non-decreasing in I, we obtain the following su¢ cient condition:
Proposition 2 For a given percentage decline in o¤ shoring costs a su¢ cient condition for the magnitude of the output e¤ ect to be increasing in I is:
This condition ensures that the …rst term in (15) does not fall in I and is proved in appendix A. 11 If Proposition 2 holds then the productivity gains due to savings on infra-marginal tasks exceed the rise in costs as more di¢ cult-to-o¤shore tasks are moved abroad. Speci…cally, the proposition indicates that, conditional on the e¤ective labor supplies of the countries, whether the output e¤ect is increasing or decreasing in o¤shoring costs depends on the form of the cost function, t(i), as well as the elasticity of substitution between tasks, . If the cost function is too steep then the cost of o¤shoring the marginal task may rise "faster" than the productivity gain from doing so, and the magnitude of the output e¤ect will progressively fall. In contrast, if the elasticity of substitution between tasks is large enough then …rms are able to shift labor toward o¤shored tasks "faster" than the increase in marginal costs from performing more di¢ cult-to-o¤shore task overseas, and the output e¤ect will progressively grow. 12 Note that when = 1 the condition is always satis…ed.
In order to give a sense of the evolution of aggregate employment of production labor given the dynamics of the output e¤ect just described, I combine the log-di¤erentiation of (6) with (7) and (11).
This leads to the following expression for the percentage change in the demand for production labor for a percentage decline in o¤shoring costs:
where the …rst term in the curly brackets re ‡ects the direct employment loss due to o¤shoring and the subsequent terms combine the output and substitution e¤ects. The combined e¤ects in (16) thus determine the employment response to a percentage decline in o¤shoring costs as a function of I-i.e., as a function of the extent of (previous) o¤shoring.
In order to illustrate these results more clearly I choose values for and a functional form for t(i) and plot the term in curly brackets in (16). 13 First, the choice of values for the elasticity of substitution can be narrowed somewhat by using elasticity estimates between manual and communication tasks from Peri and Sparber (2009) , estimated in the context of immigration ‡ows. While this measure assumes there are only two types of production tasks, rather than a continuum, it likely re ‡ects one of the primary dimensions that determines the relative substitutability of tasks under o¤shoring. It is estimated by these authors to be between 0.63 and 1.42, depending on the speci…cation. Since most tasks are likely "closer" on the task continuum than these two broad task types, I use the upper bound as a starting point and then consider progressively larger values of .
Next, a functional form for t(i) must be chosen, and here I simply choose the convex function t(i) = i 2 , where > 0. The magnitude of governs the steepness of the function at all i and so parameterizes the fact that for some industries production may require the performance of many tasks that are quite vulnerable to o¤shoring (small ), whereas other industries utilize only a few tasks that 1 2 See Wrona and Kohler (2010) for a detailed discussion of the e¤ect of di¤erent functional forms for t(i) on the potential non-monotonicity of the productivity gains due to o¤shoring.
1 3 The magnitude of the ratio of e¤ective production labor endowments,
, is set to 1.
are easily o¤shored (large ). Again, in the latter case moving up the task spectrum to higher values of i means moving relatively quickly into tasks that are di¢ cult to o¤shore. Furthermore, the choice of a convex function imposes the assumption that it is the easiest-to-o¤shore tasks that are the most a¤ected by a marginal decline in o¤shoring costs-i.e., more of them are o¤shored for a given decline in . Figure 3a plots (16) between tasks is also su¢ ciently low. Figure 3b indicates that when the slope of t(i) is relatively ‡at the productivity gains dominate and there is no decline in employment at any point. In this case, the output e¤ect always exceeds the direct employment e¤ect and o¤shoring produces a net employment gain at all I. Furthermore, at high elasticities of substitution the e¤ect is strongest and employment growth is increasing relatively rapidly.
Substitution E¤ect
Falling o¤shoring costs will also a¤ect production labor demand through the two relative price terms in (6), which will collectively be referred to as the "substitution e¤ect" of o¤shoring and which re ‡ect, …rst, the substitution between the non-production factor and the production factor-given by the term
and to be referred to as factor substitution-and, second, within the production factor between domestic tasks and foreign tasks-given by
and to be referred to as task substitution.
Writing the factor substitution term as
and noting from the previous section that under o¤shoring b q = 0 and b w + [ (I) < 0, it follows that the factor substitution term is increasing in the extent of o¤shoring. Next, conditional on factor substitution, the task substitution term will be declining since
So task substitution leads to a decline in the average price of production workers that is more rapid than the fall in the Home wage, which implies substitution away from Home tasks and toward Foreign tasks. Therefore, taking the task and factor substitution e¤ects together, the net impact on the employment of production workers from the substitution e¤ect depends on whether substitution toward the production factor outweighs substitution toward foreign tasks-i.e., it depends on the relative magnitudes of the factor and task substitution terms 14 .
The Demand for Non-Production Tasks
Since the empirics will separately examine the impact on production and non-production employment of increased ease of o¤shoring production tasks, I simply note here the form of the labor demand function for non-production tasks. Note that it will still be assumed that only production tasks can be moved o¤shore. Following the derivation in section 2.1, the demand for non-production tasks under o¤shoring of production tasks is given by:
. Note that the components of the demand function are analogous to (6), however there is no direct employment e¤ect for non-production labor. For the scale and substitution e¤ects the comparative statics described above carry over.
Data and Variables

Measuring the Extent of O¤shoring
The independent variable of interest will be , a measure of the non-task-speci…c costs of o¤shoring encompassing a wide range of barriers, including the current state of communications technologies, infrastructure developments in potential o¤shoring hubs, government policies (e.g., tari¤s or non-tari¤ policy barriers), transport costs, and many other factors. Here, I begin by constructing a direct measure of the extent of o¤shoring (note that this is the inverse of ) by U.S. …rms over the period 1997-2007-speci…cally, a measure of the o¤shoring of material inputs into production. I use the narrow measure from Feenstra and Hanson (1999) 15 in which changes in o¤shoring are re ‡ected in 1 4 Note that when = 0, as in GRH (2008), there is no task substitution and therefore no ambiguity as to the impact due to the substitution e¤ect.
1 5 A variety of measures of o¤shoring have been used in the literature. This particular measure has been criticized for possibly being too broad a measure, potentially capturing more than just the displacement of domestic value added by foreign intermediate inputs. In other words, it may capture new intermediate inputs into the production process as well. However, Feenstra (1994) shows that the e¤ect of new varieties on average costs is equivalent to a reduction in the cost changes in the imports of intermediate material inputs into the production of …nal goods, and I alter the original measure by ensuring that the economy-wide import shares used to proxy for industry import shares only re ‡ect economy-wide imports of intermediate inputs as a share of total consumption of intermediates, rather than total imports relative to total consumption, as in Feenstra and Hanson (1999) (see appendix C for a detailed explanation of this measure). Formally, the measure is:
where industries z and k are restricted to the same 3-digit North American Industry Classi…cation System (NAICS) category and U.S. input-output tables are used to capture the purchased value of
This measure clearly directly re ‡ects falling o¤shoring costs. However it is also likely correlated with domestic industry-level demand shocks that also a¤ect the distribution and range of tasks performed domestically, i.e., the dependent variable in the regression speci…cations. Of greatest concern are technological shocks that impact domestic production tasks while simultaneously reducing the costs of o¤shoring. Some of these technological shocks will be controlled for explicitly in the regressions, but others are likely to be absorbed in the error term. I therefore adopt two time-and industry-varying instruments for the o¤shoring variable de…ned by (18): MFN and regional tari¤ rates aggregated to the …nal industry level using the U.S. input-output tables in a similar manner as (18), and a measure of destination-country driven o¤shoring costs.
The …rst instrument is straightforward to construct and the use of tari¤s as an instrument is common in the literature; however, the second instrument deserves some explanation. This instrument relies on the fact that some portion of the variation in o¤shoring by U.S. …rms is due exclusively to policy decisions in the destination countries. For example, 53 percent of the growth in o¤shoring over 1997-2007, as measured by (18), is due to growth in o¤shoring to China, and a great deal of this growth is due to policy decisions within China that are exogenous to employment within U.S. manufacturing industries. In order to isolate this variation I follow a method used in Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2008) for the other eight countries as well and motivates the selection of low-income country destinations.
Formally, the instrument is:
where Of f 1994 cz is the level of o¤shoring by U.S. …rms to country c in industry z in 1994 and 4G ct is manufacturing growth in country c and year t.
Again, it is important to note that whereas the variable of interest in the model, , represents o¤shoring costs, the measures described here capture the extent of o¤shoring, its inverse, so the regression coe¢ cients should be interpreted with this in mind.
Industry Output, Wages, and Control Variables
Most variables used come from the Annual Survey of Manufactures and Economic Censuses, 1997 Censuses, -2007 , and are classi…ed by six-digit NAICS. Speci…cally, industry shipments are used as a measure of output, the production and non-production wages are used to construct the relative wage, and industry capital expenditures are used as a control. See appendix B for more details about the construction of the dataset.
Estimating the Employment Impact of O¤shoring
Before introducing cross-industry heterogeneity in o¤shorable labor, this section will …rst estimate the average magnitudes of the direct and output e¤ects of o¤shoring across all industries, conditional on the substitution e¤ect.
The Average Employment E¤ect of O¤shoring
First, taking logs, the labor demand function in (6) can be rewritten as:
where the substitution terms (in brackets) are now separated into a component that is directly observable, given by the relative price terms qa h (z) and wa l (z), and a component that cannot be directly observed, indicated by F (I; z) a l (z)
Recalling from (5) that (I) captures the distribution of production tasks across Home and Foreign (i.e., it is a function of I), rather than speculate as to the relative magnitudes of and 1 l (z) (and therefore the sign of F (I; z)), it is enough to note that this term re ‡ects variation in employment due to o¤shoring and thus can be combined with the second term in (19), which is also a function of I. For clarity, we can therefore de…ne G(I) =
and rearrange (19):
Equation (20) will provide the structural basis for the speci…cations below. First, note that the initial term will be absorbed by industry …xed e¤ects. With respect to the second term, ln
recall from (7) that there is a direct, inverse relationship between the location of the marginal task, I, and the level of o¤shoring costs, given by in the model and re ‡ected in the o¤shoring measure described in 3.1. Since this term is a function of I and z the estimation will proceed by …rst running a regression based directly on (20) that includes the o¤shoring measure as a proxy for ln fa l (z) [(1 I) + G(I)]g, with the dependence on z explored in the following section. 19 The regression will also include industry output (Y (z)), relative wages
wa l (z) and other control variables. This is the regression often run in the literature and, as discussed, re ‡ects only the direct employment e¤ect of o¤shoring. It is given by:
where the additional control variables Comp zt ; Inv zt ; and IM P zt are in logs and are subsumed in The inclusion of controls for computer use and capital investment is intended to control for variation in productivity due to skill-biased technical change, while the import share of …nal goods is included in order to control for trade-related determinants of industry output that are not captured by o¤shoring-in particular, the reduction in output resulting from loss of domestic market share in …nal goods.
Furthermore, to the extent that there are demand shocks common to industries, or time-invariant, industry-speci…c features that determine the level of employment, these will be captured by the time and industry …xed e¤ects, respectively. Lastly, any common wage e¤ect due to o¤shoring will be absorbed by the time …xed e¤ects.
One potential pitfall in running regressions based on (21) is that an explicit assumption of the model is that industry output is a¤ected by o¤shoring and, as a result, the instrument for o¤shoring cannot satisfy the exclusion restriction since Y contains o¤shoring itself. As a solution to this problem I instrument for industry output by dropping the import share of …nal goods from (21) and instrumenting for Y using variation in tari¤s on …nal goods in each industry-year. Again, import competition is likely a source of variation in manufacturing output over this period, though to ensure the variation is exogenous tari¤s are used rather than import shares. Since the instruments for o¤shoring described in section 3.1 are also included in the …rst stage and may also a¤ect industry output, there are now e¤ectively three instruments for two endogenous regressors. As indicated in the reported …rst-stage F statistics in Table 1 , this combination of instruments serves as a strong source of exogenous variation.
Column (3) of Table 1 indicates that a one percentage point increase in the extent of o¤shoring (due to destination country driven declines in o¤shoring costs) is associated with a 1.38 percent direct decline in production worker hours. Given that the average extent of o¤shoring increased by eight percentage points over this period, this estimate translates to approximately 323,000 total jobs lost over this period, during which 2.8 million production jobs, or 22.6 percent of all production jobs, were lost within the manufacturing sector (see Figure 3) . The direct employment e¤ect due to o¤shoring is therefore responsible for 11.5 percent of production job losses over the period.
Next, taking the log of (10)
and using the results in section 2.2.2 motivates a regression of output on the o¤shoring measure (recall
wa l (z) ) and other controls. Speci…cally, I estimate:
where the control variables (Comp; Inv) are again in logs and are subsumed in X. The o¤shoring measure and the variables Comp and Inv are lagged one period under the assumption that their impact on output may take time to manifest, while the relative wage and import penetration measures are contemporaneous. Since the error term in (23) is almost certainly correlated with the error term in (21) (i.e., cov( zt ; " zt ) 6 = 0), e¢ ciency can be improved by running both regressions jointly as seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). 20 In addition, since o¤shoring will be instrumented for using the measures discussed in section 3.1, the regressions will ultimately be run jointly using the iterated form of the three-stage least squares (IT3SLS) method which combines SUR with 2SLS. In short, the IT3SLS estimator is motivated by the fact that the SUR estimator requires a cross-equation covariance matrix, and in the context of endogenous regressors one can be calculated using the results from 2SLS regression on the individual equations.
By taking the product of the coe¢ cient on the o¤shoring measure from this regression and the coe¢ cient on industry output in (21), we can obtain the average magnitude of the employment impact due to the output e¤ect. This can then be combined with the estimate of the direct e¤ect from (21) to obtain an estimate of the aggregate, average employment impact due to o¤shoring. Note that this two stage process is directly motivated by the prediction of the model that o¤shoring impacts employment in part through the output e¤ect.
The results are presented in Column (3) in the bottom half of Table 1 . Increases in the extent of o¤shoring on average led to a statistically signi…cant increase in industry output, suggesting an output e¤ect does in fact operate, in an average sense, with the U.S. manufacturing sector. This provides evidence that economy-wide output also increases due to o¤shoring, which is an implication of Proposition 1. The magnitude of this e¤ect is such that a one percentage point increase in the extent of o¤shoring led to a 0.77 percent increase in industry output. Combining this with the coe¢ cient on output from the top half of Table 1 we …nd that this reduces the negative impact of the direct employment e¤ect by 57 percent, which supports the notion that it is important to account for this channel when estimating the employment impact of o¤shoring. On the other hand, it also demonstrates that the productivity gains due to o¤shoring are not, on average, great enough to o¤set the employment losses. Combining the direct employment and output e¤ects, on average o¤shoring can account for approximately 139,000 lost production jobs over the period, or 5.0 percent of all production jobs lost.
De…ning O¤shorable Tasks
The next objective is to test the model's prediction that the intensity of use of o¤shorable labor across (Proposition 1) and within (Proposition 2) industries determines the magnitude of the productivityenhancing cost savings due to o¤shoring, and through that the magnitude of the output e¤ect. First, in order to test Proposition 1 we require an industry-level measure of the intensity of use of o¤shorable labor, which can then be used to group industries. First, note that from (1) the portion of the workforce that can feasibly be moved o¤shore is given by l (z). Furthermore, some subset of the tasks performed by these workers, those between 0 and I, are already being performed o¤shore and, as a result, the cost share of the o¤shorable tasks performed at Home is given by l (z)(1 I). However, the Cobb-Douglas distinction in the model between the type of labor that can and cannot be moved o¤shore was used largely for tractability and likely does not accurately re ‡ect an industry's production structure. As a result, rather than use the cost share of Home production labor as a measure of o¤shorable labor intensity, I instead construct a proxy for (1 I), i.e., the range of tasks performed at Home, and set the cost share values equal to 1. This essentially removes the strict assumption that only production tasks can be moved o¤shore though there is a strong correlation between the constructed proxy and the share of production workers.
To construct this proxy, I draw from recent theory and discussion in the literature on the o¤-shorability of tasks or occupations. Though there are a variety of features that play a role in a task's o¤shorability, I focus on two that have been the most emphasized: (i) the extent to which a task can be described in rules-based form, or its routineness (see Levy and Murnane, 2006ab) , and (ii) the extent to which a task involves interacting with other people (see Blinder, 2007 Blinder, , 2009 . Next, I use data from the U.S. Department of Labor-a¢ liated O*NET database, from which measures of the routineness and "interaction-intensity" of U.S. occupations are selected. I take the average of these two measures as a re ‡ection of an occupation's "o¤shorability", given by i = [(1 Routine) + Interactivity] =2 21 .
As indicated, this e¤ectively maps out the task index, i 2 (0; 1), from the model-i.e., the measure ranks occupations according to the o¤shorability of the tasks which comprise them. This o¤shorability measure is then assigned to individuals (via their occupations) in the American Community Survey (ACS) for 2000, the earliest ACS survey 22 .
In order to construct an industry-level proxy for (1 I) that is also motivated by the structure of the model, note that the model states that the total amount of labor that is allocated to any production task in industry z is given by D l (i; z). Combining the values of i from above with the employment in each occupation from the ACS, a straightforward proxy for I is given by the (Home) employment-weighted average value of i in industry z. In the context of the model, this measure is given by
and is depicted graphically in Figure 3 . This measure captures the extent to which the tasks performed at Home are concentrated among the most routine and non-interactive tasks. As o¤shoring costs decline and the most routine and non-interactive tasks are moved o¤shore, the marginal task shifts rightward, as does A(I; z). Formally, it is easy to show that:
2 1 Since o¤shorability is decreasing in Interactivity but increasing in Routine, and since both measures are normalized to be between 0 and 1, I take the value 1 Routine so that in the …nal measure the most o¤shorable tasks are associated with low values of i, as in the model. 2 2 More details regarding the task data and the measure constructed here can be found in appendix D so that A(I; z) is increasing monotonically in I and is therefore a suitable …rst-order proxy for I.
Taking (1 A(I; z)) we obtain a theoretically motivated proxy for the intensity of use of o¤shorable labor in an industry, i.e., (1 I). Table 4 lists the most and least o¤shorable industries according to this metric.
As a preliminary test of the relevance of the measure, it is straightforward to ask whether it is able to predict the extent of future o¤shoring in an industry. In other words, if (1 A(I; z)) re ‡ects the intensity of use of o¤shorable tasks at time t, those industries that are more intensive in these tasks should subsequently o¤shore more. To test this, I …t the following regression, where the independent variable is the value of (1 A(I; z)) in industry z in 2000 and the dependent variable is the change in o¤shoring across industries over the period in z: 
The coe¢ cient is positive and signi…cant, suggesting that this measure is a strong predictor of o¤-shoring activity over the period. Noting that the mean value of (1 A(I; z)) is 0.51 with standard deviation of 0.05, the estimates suggest that a 0.10 point, or two standard deviation, di¤erence in labor o¤shorability across industries is associated with a 9.0 percentage point increase in the extent of o¤shoring over this 8-year period.
The Role of O¤shorable Labor
I now turn to the prediction of Proposition 1 of a di¤erential response to falling o¤shoring costs according to the intensity with which o¤shorable labor is used in production. Throughout this section I consider the intensity with which o¤shorable labor is used in industry z to be re ‡ected by the value of (1 A(I; z)) z in 2000, as described above. Proposition 1 can be straightforwardly tested by once again jointly estimating the following regressions:
and ln Y zt = c + 1 [Of f z;t 1 (1 A(I; z))] + x X z;t 1 + 2 ln W zt + 3 ln IM P zt + t + z + " zt (27) where now the o¤shoring variable is interacted with the proxy for the relative intensity of use of o¤shorable labor. Note that in estimating (26) Table 2 , Column (3) shows the results for regression (26). The direct employment e¤ect is clearly increasing in the use of o¤shorable labor, which again suggests that the ordering of industries by (1 A(I; z) ) is meaningful 23 . Recalling that the o¤shoring variable re ‡ects the imputed share of imported intermediates in total purchased intermediates, this result indicates that the production labor content of imported intermediates is greater, on the margin, for industries intensive in o¤shorable labor, as predicted by the model. In general, this result supports the model's prediction of a heterogeneous direct employment e¤ect across industries due to o¤shoring.
The bottom half of Table 2 , Column (3) illustrates that the magnitude of the output e¤ect also depends on the intensity of use of o¤shorable labor, as suggested in Proposition 1. The results provide evidence that output gains due to o¤shoring are the result of the productivity-enhancing cost savings that come from moving production tasks o¤shore. Multiplying 1 by 2 , we can calculate that the marginal increase in employment via the output e¤ ect for a one standard deviation (0.05 change in the value of (1 A(I; z))) increase in the intensity of use of o¤shorable labor across industries is equal to 3.08 percent. So the employment gains due to the output e¤ect are increasing in the use of o¤shorable labor. 24 While this may be in part due to the greater labor content of o¤shored inputs in these industries, the model indicates that this should lead to a second-order e¤ect only. According to the model (Proposition 2), the relevant productivity gains leading to the output e¤ect originate from savings on inframarginal, rather than marginal, tasks. Since, from Table 6 , we know that industries that use o¤shorable labor more intensively have, on average, o¤shored more over the period and thus have a larger pool of inframarginal tasks, it is certainly possible that inframarginal cost savings are driving the output e¤ect, as suggested formally by Proposition 2.
In order to test this prediction of the model explicitly, I estimate the following regression:
4 ln Y z;t:t 1 = c + 1 Of f z;t 2 + 2 4Of f z;t 1:t 2 + 3 (4Of f z;t 1:t 2 Of f z;t 2 ) + x 4X zt + t + " zt (28) where X are the control variables described previously, now in …rst-di¤erences. This regression focuses on the within-industry e¤ects of o¤shoring where the coe¢ cient 3 in (28) re ‡ects the average marginal impact on output of a change in the extent of o¤shoring over the range of previous o¤shoring. In other words, the coe¢ cient captures the extent to which the impact of o¤shoring is increasing in its level, which is the fundamental prediction of Proposition 2.
In this case, however, several instrumental variable strategies produce only weak instruments for the interaction term and so a new approach is needed. I therefore construct a new o¤shoring measure that is intended to re ‡ect only exogenous variation in the demand for imported intermediates. In other words, the instrumental variable strategy is set aside in favor of a more direct approach, as follows. First, the log of the o¤shoring measure in (18) is regressed on industry-time and country-time …xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cients on the former are then tossed out and the latter are kept as a measure of the variation in o¤shoring over the period that is due to country-speci…c factors. By interacting (the exponential of) these …xed e¤ect coe¢ cients with the level of o¤shoring across industries in each country in 1997, and then summing over countries, this produces an industry-and time-varying measure of o¤shoring that is driven by a comparative advantage mechanism similar to that used to construct the instrumental variable. Thus, again the measure relies on variation in o¤shoring costs that originate in the foreign country as a source of exogenous variation. Formally, the measure is:
where Of f 1997 cz is the level of o¤shoring by U.S. …rms to country c in industry z in 1997, ct is the vector of country-time …xed e¤ects, and = ct c;1997 is the growth in the country-speci…c factors over the period. As was the case when constructing the instruments, the goal is to remove industryspeci…c demand shocks that a¤ect U.S. employment and o¤shoring simultaneously. And, again, this is facilitated by the fact that most of the variation in this …nal measure originates from growth in o¤shoring to China, a plausibly exogenous source.
The estimates are reported in Table 3 along with the variable means and indicate that 3 is positive and signi…cant at the 5 percent level suggesting that o¤shoring indeed has an ever-growing impact on productivity. To assess the economic signi…cance of the coe¢ cient on the interaction term one can start by noting that the mean level of o¤shoring across industries over the period is approximately 17 percent and the mean annual change in o¤shoring is 0.72 percentage points. From this it can be calculated that an industry that uses imported intermediates one percentage point more than the mean sees an increased impact due to o¤shoring of approximately $650,000 in output per year (average annual output growth is $6.5 million). This translates to an additional 25,000 jobs generated per year due to the increasing impact of the output e¤ect at higher levels of o¤shoring, clearly a relatively small number. However, whether this impact is due to the role of "infra-marginal" tasks in generating cost-savings, some other mechanism, or a combination of mechanisms is not clear. For instance, it is possible that there is a "learning curve" associated with o¤shoring so that at higher levels of o¤shoring …rms are simply more e¢ cient at reaping the productivity gains. To the extent that the infra-marginal tasks are important in generating institutional knowledge they have a role in this scenario, however it is not the direct cost-savings role envisioned by the model.
The fact that, on average, employment losses due to o¤shoring are decreasing in the extent of o¤shoring provides evidence for the theoretical prediction in Proposition 2. On the other hand, the fact that the productivity gains due to o¤shoring are ever-increasing has not led to a net positive impact on employment-even within the industries that have o¤shored most the net impact remains negative. This suggests that U.S. manufacturing is best characterized by the simulated results depicted in Figure 2a , and that all industries lie at a point that is below their "initial" employment level. The upside for U.S. production workers, in the context of o¤shoring, is that the regression results above clearly suggest that future o¤shoring may lead some industries past the threshold into positive net employment gains.
The Impact of O¤shoring on High-Skill Labor
O¤shoring, as de…ned in the model, involves tasks that are performed primarily by relatively low-skill production workers, an assumption that is supported by the rank correlation between industries that o¤shore most and their production labor shares. However, according to (17) the demand for nonproduction labor will also be indirectly a¤ected by reductions in o¤shoring costs, speci…cally via the scale and substitution e¤ects, though not via the direct employment e¤ect since non-production tasks are assumed to be too costly to o¤shore. To obtain an estimate of the e¤ect of variation in output due to o¤shoring on the demand for non-production labor, I again run regression (21) with non-production labor demand as the dependent variable. Then, the coe¢ cient on the output term from this regression can be combined with the output e¤ect estimate using (23), again estimated jointly using IT3SLS, to get an estimate of the impact of o¤shoring on non-production employment. Note that the model predicts that the coe¢ cient on the o¤shoring variable from regression (21) should be zero, since there should be no direct impact of o¤shoring on non-production labor. From the top half of Table 4 Column (3) we can see that this coe¢ cient is small and negative, but not signi…cant, suggesting that o¤shoring may have a¤ected a negligible amount of non-production tasks over the period.
The bottom half of Table 4 Column (3) indicates that the output e¤ect is measured to be of nearly identical magnitude as when jointly measured with the direct e¤ect on production labor in Table 1 .
Combining this output e¤ect coe¢ cient with the coe¢ cient on output from the top half of the table
indicates that a one-percentage point increase in the extent of o¤shoring increases employment of non-production workers by 0.61 percent, or a cumulative 6.71 percent over the period. On aggregate, employment of non-production workers fell by 17.7 percent over the period, so o¤shoring clearly served to somewhat o¤set this decline. Finally, for completeness, Table 5 displays the results from running regressions (26) and (27) for the case of non-production labor. Unsurprisingly, the o¤shorable labor content of an industry does not predict o¤shoring of non-production tasks (which are hardly o¤shored).
Since, on average, non-production workers perform less-routine, more-interactive tasks more intensively than production workers, these results suggest there is rising relative demand for these skills due to o¤shoring, a result found elsewhere in the literature.
The Aggregate Employment Impact of O¤shoring
Combining the results from the previous sections, an estimate of the average impact on aggregate employment-i.e., including both production and non-production workers-can be made. Noting that the average share of production workers in employment within the manufacturing sector averages 0.71 over the period and applying the estimated contribution of o¤shoring to the decline in production worker employment and the rise in non-production worker employment, on average o¤shoring has led to a -1.60 percent decline in the employment of all workers in the manufacturing sector over the period.
Conclusions
In order to evaluate the aggregate impact of o¤shoring on employment assumptions are needed about the mechanisms at work. This suggests that a structural model may be useful in order to provide a roadmap for empirical speci…cations. This paper has provided such a roadmap based on the tasks model of o¤shoring and has used the predictions and structure to evaluate the impact of o¤shoring over the recent period within the manufacturing sector. The empirical estimates rely on the construction of a plausibly exogenous measure of o¤shoring, derived using variation in o¤shoring costs that originates in the countries to which U.S. …rms are moving production tasks. The results suggest that o¤shoring directly displaces workers while simultaneously generating cost-savings that leads to increased hiring.
Both of these e¤ects are larger for industries that use "o¤shorable" tasks more intensively, a prediction of the model. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that within industries, the cost-savings due to o¤shoring increases as o¤shoring progresses, possibly due to savings from tasks already performed o¤shore. The balance of these e¤ects is such that, on net, o¤shoring has generated an overall loss of production (low-skill) jobs in the manufacturing sector that is equal to about 5.0 percent of all jobs lost over this period. In contrast, o¤shoring has generated a 6.7 percent increase in the employment of nonproduction workers which, when combined with the loss of production jobs, resulted in an overall decline in employment of all workers of 1.60 percent.
A Proof of Proposition 2
To prove Proposition 2 we need the …rst term in brackets in (15) to increase faster with I relative to the second term in brackets. Since the second term is increasing as
falls, I consider the extreme case in which the Foreign country size goes to zero such that the second term is at a maximum. All that is left to prove for a su¢ cient condition is that the …rst term in brackets is increasing in I in this scenario. From (15) this occurs when d dI
Di¤erentiation of these terms, using the fact that
and rearranging gives the condition in Proposition 2. 2001. This only occurs for a small minority of industries and so only removes a small amount of relevant variation. For the case of the capital investment variable this can, in fact, be done using the more disaggregate categories of structures and equipment and then recombining these. Also, some industries in the ASM data have missing information due to the disclosure reasons. While some of this data can be directly imputed from more aggregate industry information, in a few cases the method of imputing values described above was used.
B Construction of Industry Variables
C Construction of the O¤shoring Measure
This appendix draws from Feenstra and Jensen (2009) to which this author contributed. The goal is to update the o¤shoring measure described in Feenstra and Hanson (1999) which is de…ned for any industry z purchasing inputs k as:
The primary shortcoming of this measure is the use of good k's share of imports in total domestic consumption, in the numerator, which is computed for the entire U.S. economy. As it is stated, (29) essentially assumes that the economy-wide import share for good k is the same as the industry z import share for good k, which is the "import comparability" assumption.
Given this limitation of (29), there are still some improvements that can be considered. Speci…-cally, I recalculate the measure of o¤shoring in (29) Note that the import share used in the numerator of (18) restricts the set of goods used in both the numerator and the denominator, so we cannot tell how it compares with the import share used in (29). Speci…cally, the denominator of this import share is constructed as: total domestic consumption i 2 U k = domestic shipments for i 2 U k + sum over imports i 2 U k sum over exports i 2 U k .
The import and export terms in this expression do not need any explanation: they are simply the sum over HS imports or exports within the NAICS industry k that are also intermediate inputs ( (1997, 2002, 2007) . The values are by 6-digit NAICS.
Each observation in the Economic Census benchmark dataset contains a purchasing industry, a corresponding intermediate industry which provides inputs, and a total value of purchases (inputs).
To obtain purchases for all years for an industry from a particular intermediate industry, I simply interpolate and extrapolate the benchmark values linearly throughout the period 1997 to 2007.
The next step is to construct the import share of intermediates in domestic consumption of intermediates. This industry share will be merged with the input-providing industries from the purchases data described above. First, we merge data on imports and exports from Feenstra (1996 Feenstra ( , 2002 The industries with the greatest di¤erence are simply consumer items that are imported directly to retail outlets, so these imports are clearly …nal goods, and therefore omitted from the revised o¤shoring measure.
D Industry Task O¤shorability Measure
The key dataset used is the O*NET dataset. The purpose of the dataset is to provide information on a range of occupations, and to this end 1100 occupations are surveyed with a corresponding measure Turning to the speci…c attributes selected, I …rst construct a measure of the intensity of human interaction inherent in a task. Blinder (2007) does just this using the O*NET data, and I follow his method. He begins by selecting …ve O*NET variables which re ‡ect the extent to which an occupation requires face-to-face interaction . Because O*NET rates these attributes on two scales-"importance"
and "level"-he arbitrarily combines these in a Cobb-Douglas combination, giving "importance" a two-thirds weight and "level" a one-third weight. Letting I i represent the value for the "importance" of the i th attribute and l i represent the value for the "level" of the i th attribute, the overall measure of occupation j's dependence on face-to-face interaction is S j = P i 1;5
For the measure of the routineness of the occupation, I simply take the average of the occupation features that fall under the O*NET Work Context category "Routine versus Challenging Work". I then take the simple average of these two measures of routineness and human interaction to create an aggregate measure of an occupation's vulnerability to o¤shoring due to the features of the tasks which comprise it . Still, along the spectrum of this aggregate measure there are occupations that are not remotely o¤shorable due to other idiosyncratic features of the occupations which require that they are performed at home. For example, some occupations such as construction jobs, though they : 1997-2007 . The offshoring measure is based on the Feenstra and Hanson (1999) definition and is constructed as described in section 3. Time and Industry fixed effects are included. 1-A(I,z) : 1997-2007 . The offshoring measure is based on the Feenstra and Hanson (1999) definition and is constructed as described in section 3. Time and Industry fixed effects are included. : 1997-2007 . The offshoring measure is based on the Feenstra and Hanson (1999) definition and is constructed as described in section 3. Time fixed effects are included. : 1997-2007 . The offshoring measure is based on the Feenstra and Hanson (1999) definition and is constructed as described in section 3. Time and Industry fixed effects are included. 1-A(I,z) : 1997-2007 . The offshoring measure is based on the Feenstra and Hanson (1999) definition and is constructed as described in section 3. Time and Industry fixed effects are included. Note: The extent of offshoring measure is the Feenstra-Hanson (1999) measure described in section 3.1. The construction of (1-A(I,z)) is described in section 4.2.
